>И имел место "позиционный тупик авианосной тактики первого рода",
Немного начётничества:
Almost as important for Japanese chances of success as the poor levek of pilot training was their general attack tactics which had changed little from 1942. Essentially they relied on a straight thrust with little or no evasion, at high altitude in massed formations with fighter cover above and behind and on the flanks. The idea behind this doctrine was simple - punch through the combat air patrol with sufficient number of attack aircraft and the vulnerable American carries could be taken. It had worked in 1942 and this time the Japanese had no reason to belive it would not work again. Spectacular advances in American radar equipment and doctrine changes had rendered such tactics impractical, in fact, suicidal. Even had the Japanese pilots been more skilful it is highly doubtful that they could have succesfully run the CAP gauntlet which American radar provided. In 1942 a raid might be intercepted at 25 miles range and on some occasions dive bombers had started their dives before they were hit. In this battle most Japanese aircraft were met at about 60 miles and had to fight off interceptors for 15 minutes before they reached the American ships. The task may have been impossible using these tactics.
Это из W.D. Dickson The Battle of Philippine Sea. June 1944.
То есть он считает, что тактика массированного прорыва ПВО АУГ на больших высотах в принципе была обречена в 1944 г. - у обороняющейся стороны было аж 15 минут для борьбы со страйком. Неявно предполагается, что могла существовать какая-то другая тактика. Но Диксон не пишет - какая. Простым отрицанием можно получить "выход в атаку на малых высотах небольшими группами", однако очевидные трудности такой тактики едва ли позволяют считать её возможным решением.
