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Skvortsov
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VLADIMIR
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20.06.2020 12:16:58
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Рубрики
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WWII; Флот; ВВС;
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Re: А кто...
>>Верховное британское командование рассматривало сценарий оставления ... восточной части моря в целом.
>- - -
>The high command in London considered abandoning the island and the eastern half of the sea. In the inter-war years the island had been written off as indefensible by the British Royal Air Force and Army given the financial constraints of the time—against the protests of the Navy. However, Prime Minister Winston Churchill overruled this, ordering that Malta must be held.
Уже на уровне комитета начальников штабов было отвергнуто предложение Адмиралтейства. На уровне Комитета Обороны и Правительства даже не рассматривалось.
Actually, on the 17th of June, Admiral Pound signalled to the Commander-in-Chief a tentative proposal that part of the Mediterranean Fleet should come westward to Gibraltar and the rest be sent there round the Cape, and Admiral Cunningham replied at once to the effect that the suggested movements were practicable, but that the consequences would be the loss of Egypt and of Malta.
On the same day the Prime Minister minuted to the First Lord that ‘it is of the utmost importance that the fleet at Alexandria should remain to cover Egypt from an Italian invasion which would otherwise destroy prematurely all our position in the East. ... Even if Spain declares war it does not follow that we should quit the eastern Mediterranean.’
Next day Admiral Cunningham sent another message lest his first should have been read, in London, as ‘somewhat acquiescent’, expressing his ‘earnest hope that such a decision would never have to be taken’ and deprecating the ‘landslide in territory and prestige’ which would result.So much for the views of the responsible Commander-in-Chief. How far these views influenced the final decision to drop the proposal is not clear even to this day.
The Chiefs of Staff received the Admiralty’s proposal on the 17th—the day that Admiral Cunningham’s replies were received in London—and referred it to their Joint Planning Sub-Committee. The conclusion of the latter was that ‘the . . . political, economic and military reasons for retaining the fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean outweigh the purely naval reasons for its withdrawal’. Possibly in consequence of this and of Admiral Cunningham’s replies, the Chiefs of Staff never recommended withdrawal to the Defence Committee or Cabinet. On the 3rd of July the Chiefs of Staff told all Commanders-in-Chief that it was intended to keep the fleet in the eastern Mediterranean.
Roskill, Stephen. The War at Sea Volume I. The Defensive (HMSO Official History of WWII - Military Book 1)