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Свежий Jane's Intelligence Review о формировании постоянной группировки в Чечне

Jane's Intelligence Review
October 1, 2000
EUROPE; Vol. 12; No. 10
Russia's Chechen war reaches crisis point
Michael Orr is a Senior Lecturer at the Conflict Studies Research
Centre, Camberley. The opinions expressed in the article are his ownand not necessarily the views of the Ministry of Defence or UKgovernment.

Internal Russian politics have once again committed Moscow to fighting a debilitating guerrilla war in Chechnya, but how long can this conflict be sustained? Michael Orr examines the problems facing the Russian troops as winter approaches. AFTER NEARLY 15 months, Russia's war in Chechnya only rates an occasional mention in the Western media. However, even by official figures, nearly 3,000 Russian soldiers have died. Russian losses still average about 20 killed and 70-80 wounded each week. Chechen casualties, civilians and guerrillas, cannot be reliably calculated but must total several thousand deaths. Only the most optimistic of Russian official spokesmen, such as Deputy Chief of the General Staff General Valerii Manilov, claim to foresee an end to the fighting, although they still claim victory in the campaign so far. What did Russia achieve in the first year of the war and how are operations likely to develop in the future? Russia's Chechen objectives To judge Russia's success in the war its objectives must first be understood. However, these have only been stated in very general terms. The Russians call the war a 'counter-terrorist operation' aimed at 'restoring constitutional order' in the Chechen republic. Russia has achieved a military occupation of most of Chechnya and imposed direct presidential rule from Moscow. However, the terrorist elements in Chechnya are probably stronger than in August 1999, even if President Aslan Maskhadov's field forces have been dispersed. Dr Mark Galeotti's article in the August 2000 issue of JIR demonstrates how far Russia is from achieving a political settlement in the region. However, there is no reason to think that the Russian political or military leadership have ever seen the war as a conventional counter-insurgency operation in Western terms or that their objectives were focussed in Chechnya. The political leadership wanted to rally the Russian electorate around Vladimir Putin as a potential president, and they succeeded. The military leadership wanted to avenge the defeats of 1994-96 and to demonstrate the continuing utility of the armed forces. No doubt many senior officers hoped to restore military prestige and budgets while promoting their own careers. There is no evidence that in August 1999 anyone in Moscow really considered what sort of long-term political settlement in Chechnya would best serve Russia's interests, or whether military action was the best way to promote stability in the North Caucasus. In effect, and ignoring Russia's military experience in the region, they gambled that they could break Chechen resistance before their own resources were exhausted. The critical stage of that gamble has now been reached. If the Russians do not achieve decisive victory in the next few months they will probably never do so. Their military capability in the theatre of war can only decline. Phase one successes The Russians were successful during the first phase of the war - the military occupation of Chechnya - as they were able to impose their concept of the battlefield and fight their battles with long-range firepower rather than close-quarter infantry actions. The Chechen resistance played into their hands by underestimating the Russian Army, assuming it would repeat its errors of the First Chechen War. Then Russian units rarely fought as effective combined arms forces, launching under-prepared attacks to meet an unrealistic operational tempo imposed by the High Command. As a result, the Russians did not exploit their superiority in hardware, such as aircraft, artillery or armoured vehicles. In infantry battles in towns and mountains, the Russian troops were always inferior in training and leadership. In 1999 the Chechens initially put their trust in prepared defences. They expected them to neutralise Russian firepower and armour, allowing them to repeat their success against unsupported infantry. However, the staff who planned the new Russian campaign had learned their lesson. Time was not a major factor in their calculations, but concentration of overwhelming firepower was crucial. Between the wars, the ground forces had created a number of better- manned and trained formations and units, optimistically called 'permanent readiness forces'. In fact, although the Chechen incursions into Dagestan were checked by early September it was mid- October before the 'Joint Force Grouping' was ready for operations in Chechnya. By that time a force of about 90,000 men had been assembled and given a few weeks of training in theatre. When the Russian advance began, their tactics were effectively based on an updated version of the First World War's 'bite and hold', 'artillery conquers, infantry occupies' principles. While reviewing the lessons of the war, Colonel General Yuriy Bukreyev, chief of the ground forces main directorate, emphasised the importance of "long-range destruction of the opposing enemy, with the aim of significantly reducing our own forces' combat losses". As Gen Bukreyev explained: "The destruction of the enemy was achieved in successive stages. In the first instance, air and artillery strikes were delivered. Then the blockaded regions were combed by combined-arms units and sub-units, which discovered and destroyed the remaining bandits, their dumps, bases and defensive positions." The use of long-range firepower to reduce casualties is not unique to the Russian Army. However, ammunition was expended at a rate that seriously depleted Russia's strategic reserves, prepared to cope with a full-scale war against NATO. It is impossible to bomb and shell areas on this scale without causing significant civilian casualties. A basic element in the Russian plan was to frighten the Chechen population so that they would put pressure on the guerrillas to abandon their prepared defences in built-up areas. Russian claims to have minimised civilian casualties ring very hollow in light of the civilian accounts of the bombardments and the pictures of the devastation in Groznyy and other towns. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that terrorism has been more typical of Russian tactics than the Chechen guerrillas. In the short term, these tactics have been effective. The guerrillas did suffer some significant losses and were forced to abandon town after town. Among the mass of the Chechen population there is a mood of war weariness and despair, so that the guerrillas have less support than in the first war. More significant in the long term, perhaps, Chechen hatred for the Russians has grown and continues to motivate new recruits for the rebels. Changing tactics In response to Russian successes, the Chechen rebels have changed their tactics and turned to classic guerrilla warfare and urban terrorism. The Russians are now faced by sniper attacks on their block houses, ambushes and road mines on their convoys, assassination of individual soldiers on the streets and suicide- bombings of their barracks. Replying with air strikes or artillery bombardments is unlikely to be effective but almost guaranteed to cause civilian casualties. Senior officers are beginning to realise that they are no longer fighting their sort of war. The more far sighted have probably always known that they could not win a total victory in Chechnya and that they would face a prolonged insurgency. However, the issue has always been the level of insurgency that would remain in Chechnya and the size of the counter-insurgency force that would be required to deal with it. Garrison strength In December 1999 the Russians announced that a motor rifle division, 15,000-strong, would provide a permanent garrison force in Chechnya, with about 10,000 troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The general staff apparently believes that about 25,000 men can be maintained in Chechnya over a long period. This is worth examining in detail. The title of 42nd Guards Motor Rifle Division (MRD) has been revived for the new division formed in Chechnya. It consists of four motor rifle regiments, an artillery regiment and supporting units. Its headquarters are located at Khankala, just outside Groznyy. This is also the base for the 71st Motor Rifle Regiment (MRR), recruited in the Volga Military District (MD). 70 MRR, formed in the Urals MD, is based in Shali; 72 MRR, raised from the Taman Division of the Moscow MD is in Kalinovskaya; and 291 MRR, originating in the Leningrad MD, is garrisoned at Borzoy. Each regiment is about 2,500-strong, and according to the division's commander, Major General Arkadiy Bakhin, each has its own special manpower establishment, depending on its location and mission. 72 MRR, for example, has four companies per motor rifle battalion, rather than the conventional three. 291 MRR will specialise in mountain warfare. Creating the division has not been easy. Maintaining it may prove to be even more difficult. Building fortified barracks for the division has required a major construction effort and 291 MRR had to be relocated from the base originally planned for it, Itum-Kale, when the tactical vulnerability of the position was appreciated. It is still not certain that all elements of the division will be properly housed before winter sets in. Manning the division has been a problem. Although it seems that most officers received promotion on transferring to the new division, there were apparently difficulties in filling the posts. According to some reports, 100 officers had to be transferred from 201 MRD in Tajikistan. Given these problems, there was little opportunity to pick and choose, and there must be doubts about the quality of the division's leaders. General Shamanov, the commander of 58th Army to which 42 MRD is subordinate, publicly denounced one battalion's chief of staff as unfit to be an officer. The rank and file are probably no better. The majority of soldiers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) are conscripts, but there is a significant proportion of 'contract servicemen'. These are not professional soldiers as the term is understood in Western armies. Many are little more than mercenaries. There have already been complaints about the number who sign a contract out of desperation. They are not expected to last long under the strain of active service in Chechnya. On the other hand, the Russian Army's regulations on service in Chechnya actually limit the effectiveness of the conscript intake. Conscripts should not be sent to Chechnya until they have completed at least six months service. Service in Chechnya counts treble time (six months in Chechnya is considered the equivalent of 18 months service elsewhere). Thus at the end of six months initial training and six months active duty in Chechnya, a conscript will have completed the equivalent of the normal two year period of conscription and be due for release, unless he volunteers to sign a contract and remain with the division. It is likely that 42 MRD will have to replace up to 70% of its other ranks every six months. If it is difficult to man the division now, what chance is there of retaining or replacing personnel in the future? It may be expected that the division, due to its crucial role in the Russian Army's main operational commitment, would have been supplied with the best equipment available. In fact, officers have been complaining about the age of their weapons. The division is equipped with T-62 main battle tanks, and at least one regiment has BMP-1 armoured personnel carriers. These systems are 30 years out of date and very vulnerable to even the light anti-armour systems used by the guerrillas. Apart from their tactical vulnerability, everyday maintenance of such obsolete equipment in the harsh conditions of Chechnya is a huge problem. It is hard to believe that the Russian Army is in such a desperate plight that it has to depend on such a force. There is no reason to think that recruiting and equipping the brigade of Internal Troops, which is to complete the permanent garrison, is any easier. The Russians do not yet dare to reduce their Chechen grouping to anything approaching the planned level of 25,000 men. By the beginning of August, the Joint Force Grouping had been reduced from 90,000 to 80,000 men, of whom 50,000 were Ministry of Defence troops. The North Caucasus MD is effectively fully deployed for the Chechen War, and other military districts are still being levied to provide contingents from their permanent readiness forces. The burden lies most heavily on the so-called 'elite' airborne forces and naval infantry. The airborne forces (VDV) are heavily committed to their peacekeeping roles in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere, but are still expected to provide over 4,000 men in Chechnya. At the beginning of 2000, a third of the VDV were deployed on peacekeeping operations or in Chechnya. Commitments have been reduced and an establishment increase has been promised. However, the VDV will be over-stretched for the foreseeable future. The airborne units in Chechnya are serving six-month tours and being rotated as units. The same system applies for the standard motor rifle units that are sent to Chechnya. Some specialist sub-units, such as signals or engineers, may serve even shorter tours. This may be the easiest way to man the units, but it restricts combat effectiveness. As the USA found in Vietnam, such short tours mean that the counter-insurgency force never has more than six months experience at a time, and never acquires the detailed knowledge of the theatre that is essential for success. The manpower situation may reach crisis point by the time a new rotation is due early next year. A number of factors are combining to ensure that the Russian Army will not be able to maintain the present force level. General and long-standing problems in the Russian conscription system mean it is always a struggle to fill the ranks. Since the start of the present war in Chechnya draft evasion has been increasing, and the longer the war continues the greater will be the trend to dodge conscription. Also, the triple-time provision for Chechen service means that every six months more men are being discharged than are recruited. It will be increasingly difficult for the ground and airborne forces to keep units at an effective strength, whether in Chechnya or elsewhere. In the first phase of the war the Russians were able to raise the proportion of contract servicemen in Chechen units from 7% in October 1999 to a claimed 40% in April 2000. However, it appears that a significant proportion will not complete their contracted tour, either because they are rejected by their units or because they break their contracts and leave. Replacing them will be complicated. Many contract servicemen were attracted by the special allowances paid for service in Chechnya, but these have now been reduced. There are constant reports of payments being delayed or not received at all. This is bound to reduce the number of men willing to sign a contract or re-engage after a tour in Chechnya. The future? The crisis could be avoided if the operational situation permitted a major reduction in the Russian deployment in Chechnya. However, the war has been at a stalemate for some time. A premature force reduction would allow the guerrillas to reclaim the initiative, as they did in August 1996. A more skillful and professional counter-insurgency force might retain the upper hand with smaller numbers. However, there is little prospect of the Russians creating such a strike force, although they have achieved some successes with special forces. Recent attempts at larger-scale offensives against the Chechen rebels have been clumsy 'search and destroy' missions that have generally missed their targets. As the end of the year approaches, the loss of tree cover in the mountains may make concealment more difficult for the guerrillas, but winter will also restrict Russian mobility and hit the morale of static garrisons. The guerrillas remain divided among themselves, but that only complicates the Russian task because it increases the number of leaders they need to strike at, or negotiate with. It is becoming obvious that the Russians have no doctrine for the war that they are fighting. There are some tactical notes relating to low-level matters such as control post duties, or cordon and search operations. However, even after their experiences in Afghanistan and the First Chechen War, the Russians still seem to lack an operational understanding of guerrilla warfare. In particular, they have not appreciated that successful counter- insurgency depends on realistic political objectives, which are incorporated in tactical as well as operational planning. The danger is that Russian strategic objectives may become even wider and less realistic. Frustrated by their inability to finish the war, the military leadership may try to blame others for their lack of success. There are already indications that the generals would like to extend the war to strike at the guerrilla bases that they claim are in Georgia and Ingushetia. Any extension of the war, whether on Russian Federation territory or outside it, would be very dangerous. Russia cannot afford a wider war and would face a humiliation that might lead to the disintegration of the armed forces or a wider political collapse. The Russian military leadership began the present war determined to avoid the disasters of the First Chechen War. So far they have been largely successful, but they are in danger of repeating the mistakes made during the war in Afghanistan. The Chechen guerrillas lack the range of foreign support that the Afghan mujahideen received. However, they are not without backers, and they can probably maintain a tactical stalemate until the political price of the war is too high for Russia. (This may not take as long as in Afghanistan.) There is, however, a significant difference between the Afghan and Chechen Wars. President Mikhail Gorbachev could afford to cut his losses and withdraw from Afghanistan. It was not Soviet territory, and the war was not his war. President Vladimir Putin and his senior military advisors are implicated in the Chechen War, which is being fought on Russian Federation territory. They cannot afford to contemplate defeat.