>Верховное британское командование рассматривало сценарий оставления ... восточной части моря в целом.
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The high command in London considered abandoning the island and the eastern half of the sea. In the inter-war years the island had been written off as indefensible by the British Royal Air Force and Army given the financial constraints of the time—against the protests of the Navy. However, Prime Minister Winston Churchill overruled this, ordering that Malta must be held.
About Mark Simmons
Mark Simmons was born in PLymouth into a family with a long tradition of service in the Royal Navy and Royal Marines. In the 1970's he served in the Royal Marines, with 40 Commando RM, 3 Commando Brigade, and with the Commando Logistics Regiment
In the 1980's he was a member of the Confederate Historical Society and the American Civil War Reserach Association.
He has written over one hundred feature articles, mainly on naval/military and travel subjects for publication in the UK and USA.
His first book "A Crack in Time" a search for the echoes of the American Civil War was published in 2004.
"From the Foam of the Sea" his first novel was published in 2007 telling the story of Royal Marines on Cyprus, it has been compared to the work of Alistair MacLean and Desmond Bagley.
"The Serpent and the Cross" was published in August 2010, the story of an SOE operation in Italy during World War II, set against the background of Motor Racing another of Mark's interests. It has been profiled in the Alfa Romeo Owners Club Magazine.
His non-fiction naval history book "The Battle of Matapan 1941" was published in April 2011, reviews have been good,and sales encouraging.
>>Верховное британское командование рассматривало сценарий оставления ... восточной части моря в целом.
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>The high command in London considered abandoning the island and the eastern half of the sea. In the inter-war years the island had been written off as indefensible by the British Royal Air Force and Army given the financial constraints of the time—against the protests of the Navy. However, Prime Minister Winston Churchill overruled this, ordering that Malta must be held.
Уже на уровне комитета начальников штабов было отвергнуто предложение Адмиралтейства. На уровне Комитета Обороны и Правительства даже не рассматривалось.
Actually, on the 17th of June, Admiral Pound signalled to the Commander-in-Chief a tentative proposal that part of the Mediterranean Fleet should come westward to Gibraltar and the rest be sent there round the Cape, and Admiral Cunningham replied at once to the effect that the suggested movements were practicable, but that the consequences would be the loss of Egypt and of Malta.
On the same day the Prime Minister minuted to the First Lord that ‘it is of the utmost importance that the fleet at Alexandria should remain to cover Egypt from an Italian invasion which would otherwise destroy prematurely all our position in the East. ... Even if Spain declares war it does not follow that we should quit the eastern Mediterranean.’
Next day Admiral Cunningham sent another message lest his first should have been read, in London, as ‘somewhat acquiescent’, expressing his ‘earnest hope that such a decision would never have to be taken’ and deprecating the ‘landslide in territory and prestige’ which would result.So much for the views of the responsible Commander-in-Chief. How far these views influenced the final decision to drop the proposal is not clear even to this day.
The Chiefs of Staff received the Admiralty’s proposal on the 17th—the day that Admiral Cunningham’s replies were received in London—and referred it to their Joint Planning Sub-Committee. The conclusion of the latter was that ‘the . . . political, economic and military reasons for retaining the fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean outweigh the purely naval reasons for its withdrawal’. Possibly in consequence of this and of Admiral Cunningham’s replies, the Chiefs of Staff never recommended withdrawal to the Defence Committee or Cabinet. On the 3rd of July the Chiefs of Staff told all Commanders-in-Chief that it was intended to keep the fleet in the eastern Mediterranean.
Roskill, Stephen. The War at Sea Volume I. The Defensive (HMSO Official History of WWII - Military Book 1)