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realswat
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04.02.2016 14:57:59
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WWII; Флот;
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По поводу "американцы признали".
>Но американские адмиралы послезнанием и волей альтернативщика вооружены не были.
By the late thirties the Japanese heavy cruiser force was a serious threat to American war planners contemplating an extended campaign across the Western Pacific. Not only did the U.S. Pacific Fleet's lines of communication have to be protected from raiders; its carriers also had to be screened, since early in any war with Japan they would be making independent raids of their own, in company with the only warships that could keep up with them, the heavy cruisers. Enemy heavy cruisers were the primary surface threat they faced, so some sort of cruiser-killer was an attractive carrier escort. In 1936 the fast carrier screening role had already produced an abortive 30-knot design for what became the North Carolina and had also strongly influenced the deci-sion for speed in the Iowas. Indeed, some of the early projects leading to the Iowa design were more like cruiser-killers than fast battleships, with armor proof only against 8-in-gun cruiser fire but with 16-in guns and a speed of 35 knots.
The carrier-screening role accounts for the enthusiasm Admiral King showed for the Alaska project. He was first involved in it as commander of Aircraft, Battle Force, i.e., as a carrier force commander. Thus he was a natural proponent of the powerful escort ship. As a member of the General Board he chaired hearings on the characteristics of such ships, and as Cominch/CNO he ordered their construction and resurrected one which had been canceled, the Hawaii.
Такие вот взгляды одного небезызвестного, мягко говоря, американского адмирала. Не вооружённого послезнанием и волей альтернатищика.